

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1015/01 3161221
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121221Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0137
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5367
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2549
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1558
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6745

S E C R E T GENEVA 001015

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-010, MODIFIED PROCEDURES FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS)

REF: A. STATE 99070 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003-PART 1 OF 2)
[1](#)B. STATE 99072 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003-PART 2 OF 2)
[1](#)C. STATE 91018 (SFO-VI-GUIDANCE-001)
[1](#)D. STATE 108618 (SFO-VI-GUIDANCE-002)
[1](#)E. GENEVA 918 (SFO-GVA-VI-004)
[1](#)F. GENEVA 914 (SFO-GVA-VI-016)
[1](#)G. GENEVA 951 (SFO-GVA-VI-024)
[1](#)H. GENEVA 958 (SFO-GVA-VI-027)
[1](#)I. GENEVA 964 (SFO-GVA-VI-031)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-055 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-010.

SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED

[1](#)2. (S) The Russian delegation has consistently made two major points regarding the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers. They have steadfastly resisted treaty language that treats ballistic missiles for mobile launchers of ICBMs differently than other ballistic missiles. They have also strenuously objected to elimination procedures that require the presence of U.S. inspectors for extended periods to observe the process of elimination (REFS E and H).

[1](#)3. (S) The U.S. delegation seeks authority to revise the proposed elimination and monitoring procedures to be presented to the Russian Federation and to have the opportunity to deploy a phased series of offers, if required,

as described below. Delegation proposes to open with a revised set of elimination procedures focused solely on mobile ICBMs. If this approach fails, after an appropriate interval, we would propose to broaden the application of the revised elimination and monitoring approach to all ICBMs, mobile and silo-based, solid and liquid fueled, on both sides. The final position to be tabled, if required, would cover elimination of only mobile ICBMs, but would involve a less intrusive method of verification.

¶4. (U) Background and analysis are provided in paragraphs 5-8. The phased offers are provided in paragraphs 9-12. Guidance requested is in paragraph 13.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

¶5. (S) In accordance with the U.S. position detailed in the U.S.-proposed draft Conversion or Elimination Protocol (REFS A and B, as modified by REFS C and D), the U.S. delegation has attempted to negotiate agreement on elimination procedures for mobile ICBMs. From the outset, the Russian side has insisted on a simplified approach to ICBM elimination. They argue that the technical characteristics of an ICBM (solid or liquid propellant) are the same regardless of how it is launched (silo vs. mobile launcher), and, therefore, elimination procedures for all ICBMs should vary only as a function of their technical characteristics (REFS E, F, and G). Under the U.S. proposal, elimination procedures for silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs are very general

(i.e., elimination procedures at the discretion of the possessing Party and no requirement for any form of on-site monitoring of the process or its results). However, elimination procedures for mobile ICBMs and their launch canisters mandate specific elimination steps and require inspectors to be present to observe the final elimination step for all stages of the ICBM and the launch canister. This approach continues to highlight the dramatic differences in elimination procedures for mobile-launched ICBMs and silo-launched ICBMs. The Russian side argues that providing additional procedures for elimination of mobile ICBMs is unfair, burdensome to the Russian Federation and excessive. The Russian side has also expressed a desire for symmetrical elimination requirements that are applied equally to both Parties, and a reduction of what they perceive as an intelligence gathering opportunity for the U.S. side during extended elimination inspections.

¶6. (S) During the October 19-30, 2009 round of negotiations, the Russian side presented a revised proposal for elimination procedures of ICBMs and SLBMs, based on the type of propellant used for the ICBM or SLBM (REF E). The Russian approach would apply one set of procedures to all solid-fueled ballistic missiles and apply a different set of procedures to all liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. Under this proposal, all solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs would be eliminated using one of the following procedures: 1) removal of propellant from all stages by burning; 2) removal of propellant by other means, followed by cutting of the remaining stage motor casings in two pieces; or 3) other procedures developed by the Party conducting the elimination and demonstrated within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation and Consultation Commission (BICC) if the other Party objects when first notified of the eliminating Party's intentions.

¶7. (S) The use of procedures dependent only on the design characteristics of each ballistic missile would be valid if the ability to verify elimination were the same for all missiles. The Russians, however, reject our explanations of the need for more stringent measures for systems that are difficult to count and monitor, such as those associated with mobile ICBM launchers. The Russian proposal would, if

applied to U.S. solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, exact an undesired financial cost and operational impact on the United States; of which the Russians are undoubtedly aware. The Russians also reject any arguments that call for treating all missiles the same for the purposes of elimination, specifically resisting extending "equal" treatment to liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, which are only deployed by the Russians.

18. (S) The U.S. side has already offered simplified procedures related to the elimination of mobile ICBMs, which shorten the time U.S. inspectors would be present at Russian elimination facilities. START procedures for elimination of mobile ICBMs had U.S. inspection teams on-site to observe the entire process of elimination (elimination of all stages, nozzles, inter-stage skirts, self-contained dispensing mechanism, RV platform, front section, etc.). In the past, to observe a batch elimination of up to eight missiles, U.S. inspectors would typically spend 10-14 days at a Russian elimination facility. The current U.S. proposal for

elimination of mobile ICBMs requires inspectors to be present only to observe the final act of elimination for all stages of the ICBM as well as for the missile launch canister (REF D). The U.S. delegation believes this concession would greatly shorten the amount of time for on-site observation by U.S. inspection teams to an estimated 3-7 days. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation still objects to the burden imposed by the presence of inspectors in Russian elimination facilities (REF H).

NEGOTIATION PHASED OFFERS

19. (S) The delegation has developed a three-phased negotiating approach regarding the elimination of mobile ICBMs as a means to maintain an effective, verifiable elimination process while addressing the concerns of the Russian Federation. This three-phased negotiating approach is described in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 below.

10. (S) In the opening Phase 1 offer, the United States would continue to focus on streamlining the specified procedures for eliminating mobile ICBMs, their launch canisters and the on-site inspection associated with the elimination. This procedure would depart from the current U.S. guidance (REFS C and D) by dropping the requirement to eliminate all of the stages of each mobile ICBM to requiring only the elimination of the first stage. Procedures would still require the removal of the fuel by any means and destruction of the remaining motor case by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size or destruction by explosion and elimination of the launch canister. Verification would remain as specified in the current U.S. proposal: inspectors would have the right to observe the final elimination cut of the first stage motor case and of the launch canister (REF D). Some delegation members believe this option should also include an opportunity to view the burned out or washed out second and third stage of each mobile ICBM at the time the inspection team is on-site to observe the final elimination cut on the first stage of the missile undergoing elimination. Delegation believes implementation of this approach would dramatically reduce the time required for much observation, permitting the Russians to batch process the completion of the mobile missile elimination process for 10-20 ICBMs in the presence of U.S. inspectors in only 1 to 2 days. In any case, upon completion of the inspection observing the elimination, the items would cease to be subject to the limitations of the treaty. This option would have no negative impact on U.S. elimination procedures for ICBMs or SLBMs.

11. (S) If unsuccessful in reaching agreement with the Phase 1 offer, the Phase 2 offer would seek to address Russian objections based on the unique treatment of mobile ICBMs by

broadening elimination procedures to encompass all ICBMs, mobile and silo-based, solid and liquid-fueled. This approach would involve more complicated and more expensive elimination procedures for all types of ICBMs for both Russia and the United States. All ICBMs, regardless of how they would be launched or are fueled, would be eliminated using procedures requiring the elimination of the first stage and

would require removal of the fuel by any means and the remaining motor case to be eliminated by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size or destruction by explosion. Verification would remain as specified in the existing U.S. proposal for mobile ICBM elimination under Phase 1: inspectors would have the right to observe the final elimination cut of the first stage motor case and launch canister (REF D). Once again, some delegation members believe this option should include viewing the burned out or washed out second and third stage at the time the inspection team is on-site to observe the final elimination cut on the first stage of the missile undergoing elimination. In any case, upon completion of the inspection, the ICBM and its launch canister (if applicable) would cease to be subject to the limitations of the treaty. While this option would not resolve the Russian complaints of the intrusiveness of U.S. inspectors observing the final cuts, it would remove their argument regarding inequality since it would have negative impact on both Russian and U.S. elimination procedures for ICBMs by specifying the elimination procedures to be completed and providing the right of inspectors to observe the final cut or explosion of all types of ICBMs. This appears to be a very heavy price for "equal treatment" of all ICBMs on each side.

¶12. (S) Should Phase 2 not be successful, deployment of the Phase 3 offer would return to specific elimination procedures, only for the first stage of each mobile ICBM, but would involve use of national technical means of verification coupled with post-elimination inspections rather than on-site observation of the final step in the elimination process. Some delegation members believe that by eliminating the requirement for inspectors to be present for the final cuts will substantially address the Russian objection to intrusive inspections. Others believe an expected decrease from 10-14 days for the elimination of up to eight missiles and launch canisters to 1-2 days by using the first two procedures discussed under Phase 1 should adequately address the Russian concern about the presence of U.S. inspectors on-site for extended periods. Phase 3 procedures would require the removal of the fuel by any means and destruction of the remaining motor case by being crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or explosion. Upon completion of the elimination procedures, the two halves of the motor case would be displayed in the open, observable by NTM, for 90 days following the notification of completion of elimination. Some members believe that within that 90-day period inspectors could come to the display site to verify the elimination of the declared items by verifying the UID, confirming the cutting of the motor case and the elimination of the associated launch canisters. Others believe that NTM will not be able to verify the elimination of individual first stages and, without additional measures, inspections once in a 90-day period also would not be sufficient to verify that an individual first stage was eliminated. Upon completion of the inspection, or upon expiration of the 90-day period, if inspection is not conducted, the eliminating Party could remove the motor cases and the items would cease to be subject to the limitations of the treaty.

GUIDANCE REQUESTED

¶13. (S) The U.S. delegation seeks authorization to present the revised elimination and monitoring procedures to the Russian Federation in the phased manner described above,

should such a step-by-step process prove necessary, for mobile ICBMs and their launch canisters.

¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS